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THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND ALIENS: UNLIMITED
DISCRETION AND THE RIGHT TO FAIR TREATMENT*
CONGRESS may exclude or deport aliens for any reason it deems proper.'
The courts, however, have long held that the deportation of aliens must
conform to the procedural requirements of due process of law. 2 In recent
years, there has been an effort to make these requirements a more genuine
* U.S. ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950).
1. The Constitution makes no express provision for the control of immigration. Its
only reference to aliens is the grant of power to Congress "to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization." U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8. Nevertheless, the congressional control of immi-
gration is firmly established. The power to exclude aliens is derived from the power to con-
trol foreign commerce, Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884), and from the powers "in-
herent in sovereignty." Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). The power to
deport is regarded as a corollary of the power to exclude as well as a power incident to sov-
ereignty. See, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See, ALEXANDER,
RIGHTS or ALIENS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 28 (1931); Klainer, Deportation of
Aliens, 15 B.U.L. REv. 663, 666 (1935); Oppenheimer, The Constitutional Rights of Aliens,
1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 100 (1941); Note, 4 Wis. L. REv. 217 (1927). The view that con-
gressional power to deport is plenary has been subjected to vigorous attack from the begin-
.ning. See Justices Field and Brewer dissenting in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra
at 737, 746; Justice Murphy concurring in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945);
KONviTz, ALIEN AND ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW c. 2 (1946); Note, 44 CoL. L. REV. 736,
749 (1944).
For the history of immigration legislation, see BERNARD, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY (1950); KANSAS, U.S. IMMIGRATION, EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION (1948). A sys-
tematic summary of the basic provisions of the law can be found in Reitzel, The Immigration
Laws of the United States-An Outline, 32 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1946). For the general status
of the alien in American law, see, Alexander, supra; Konvitz, supra; GIBSON, ALIENS AND
THE LAW (1940); Legis., 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 74 (1935).
2. "[t]his court has never held . . . that administrative officers . . .may disregard
the fundamental principles that inhere in due process of law." Japanese Immigrant Case,
189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923). The alien is also
entitled to due process protection when he seeks the discretionary relief of voluntary de-
parture or suspension of deportation. U.S. ex rel. Giacalone v. Miller, 86 F. Supp. 655
(S.D. N.Y. 1949). But, the due process protection afforded the alien in deportation pro-
ceedings is less than that received by persons charged with crimes. See, Zakonaite v. Wolf,
226 U.S. 272 (1912). See also, ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35. For discussion of the
scope of the due process protection, see, generally, CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM
THE U.S. TO EUROPE (1931); KING, DEPORTATION-SUGGESTIONS TO ATTORNEYS (American
Civil Liberties Union 1936); OPPENHEIMER, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DE-
PORTATION LAws OF TM U.S. (National Commission on Law Observance & Enforcement
1931); VAN VLECE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932).
Deportation is protected by a broader scope of due process than that enjoyed by exclu-
sion. See United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (judicial determination of citizenship
denied person seeking admittance); Ng Fung 'Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (judicial
determination of citizenship granted person held for deportation). See, Note, 31 COL. L.
REv. 1013 (1931). The theory is that the alien who is stopped at the border has not yet
fully become subject to American jurisdiction, and thus to the full protection of the Con-
stitution. See United States v. Ju Toy, supra.
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guarantee of fairness to the alien. 3 One reason has been the growing recogni-
tion of the penal character of deportation decrees. 4 Another has been the
fear that uncontrolled administration of the immigration laws might unduly
harass aliens who hold unpopular political beliefs. 5
Prior to 1940, the law required automatic expulsion of all aliens who were
found to have entered the United States improperly, or to have overstayed
permits to remain in the country.6 Deportation on one of these technical
3. See, Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) (statute interpreted in such a way as to
prevent deportation of alien); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). See also, Note, 48
YALE L.J. 111 (1938). For an insight into the basis of this tendency toward greater fairness,
see CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 30-32 (1949). Progress in the administration of the
laws is noted in King, Treatment of Aliens in Two Wars, 5 LAW. GUILD REv. 208 (1945). See
note 28 infra. On the other hand, any final assessment of progress must allow for recent
tendencies toward administrative arbitrariness. See, U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950) (Attorney-General refused to reveal grounds for excluding alien war
bride from admission).
4. Deportation "may result in loss . . . of all that makes life worth living." Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). See also, U.S. ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d
630 (2d Cir. 1926); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). The deportation pro-
ceeding, while technically not criminal, "smacks of criminal procedure." McGovney, De-
portation of Aliens, 18 IowA L. REv. 187, 188 (1932). See also, Landis, Deportation and
Expulsion of Aliens in 5 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 95 (1931). For a strong argument that deportation
should be treated as a criminal proceeding with all criminal protections, See KoNVITZ, Op.
cit. supra note 1, ch. 2.
5. Much of the history of the deportation laws could be written in terms of an effort
to rid the country of political radicals. Every major addition to the law has broadened the
political grounds for deportation. See KANSAS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 206-26. The adminis-
tration of the law has been marked by the vigor of the Immigration Service in securing
political deportations. Landis, op. cit. supra note 4, at 97. The "Palmer Red Raids" follow-
ing the first world war are well known. That story is well told in POST, THE DEPORTATION
DELIRIUM (1923). See also, CHmAEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES ch. V (1941).
For a vivid description of the methods used in the administration of the laws during this
period, see Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D.C. Mass. 1920). The emphasis in the
administration of the law upon deporting alien radicals has not entirely disappeared. See
the testimony of Attorney-General Tom Clark in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Immigration of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 2933, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1946).
See also, Roberts, Investigative Work of the Service, 8 Intm. & NAT. SERV. MON. REv. 66
(1950). The charge has often been made that the Immigration Service has tended to measure
its success in terms of the number of successful deportations. See Kane, The Challenge of the
Wickersham Deportations Report, 23 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575, 581 (1932); OPPEN-
HEIMER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 49 ("the primary interest is to deport as many aliens as
possible"). See in this connection the testimony of Edward Shaughnessy, Hearings, supra
at 39, 41.
6. 43 STAT. 162 (1924), 8 U.S.C. § 214 (1946); 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U.S.C. § 155a
(1946). This also applied to alien merchants left in the United States at the termination of
commercial treaties. 43 STAT. 154 (1924), 8 U.S.C. § 203 (1946). See KANSAS, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 42-3. These "technical" reasons for deportation are distinguished by the Immi-
gration Service from deportations of criminals, moral undesirables, narcotic violators and
political undesirables. Several methods were formerly used by the Service to alleviate the
harshness of deporting aliens solely on technical grounds. OPPENHEIMER, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS 101 (1931). The most common device was delay
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grounds was often ordered many years after the alien had gained entrance
to the country.7 Frequently, the alien had sunk deep roots in the com-
munity. Nevertheless, the law made deportation mandatory even when he
possessed unimpeachable moral character and had a dependent family which
would suffer as a result of his removal. The harshness of deportation under
these circumstances occasioned persistent demands for humane reform.'
To remedy the situation, Congress granted the Attorney-General his
present power to suspend deportation orders.9 This power is limited in such
a way that only aliens who would be desirable residents can qualify for the
relief. Aliens who are deportable as subversives, narcotics violators, crimi-
nals, prostitutes, or procurers are ineligible. 1° For any alien to qualify, he
in issuing the final deportation order. See testimony of Commissioner MacCormack in
Hearings before Senate Committee on Immigration on S. 2969, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 194 (1936).
This relief was, of course, only temporary and such aliens ,%ere eventually deported.
7. The Immigration Act of 1917 contains a 3 year statute of limitation for deporta-
tions on grounds of improper entry. However, the courts have interpreted the provisions of
the Immigration Act of 1924 to supersede this limitation. If an illegal entry is made after
July 1, 1924, the alien can now be deported at any time. E.g., U.S. ex rel. Bhagat Singh v.
McGrath, 104 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1939).
S. This agitation began in earnest after the publication of three exhaustive studies of
the enforcement of the immigration laws: VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 2; CLARK, op. cit.
supra note 2; OPPENHEIMER, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS
OF THE U.S. (1931). All of these criticized the harshness of the law and recommended that
discretionary power to suspend deportations in hardship cases be granted. The Department
of Labor, which then administered the immigration laws, favored such reform. MEMO. OF
COM UISSIONER OF IMM. & NATUR. TO SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON IMm. RELATIVE
TO CERTAIN PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LAW (1934). Most of the recommendations were
embodied in the Kerr-Coolidge Bill which was first introduced in 1936. H.R. 8163, S. 2969,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). See Hearings before Senate Committee on Immigration on S.
2969, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). Though this bill was not adopted, it occasioned wide-
spread public interest which eventually produced action by Congress. For discussions of the
Kerr-Coolidge Bill, see Oppenheimer, Recent Developments in the Deportation Process, 36
MIcH. L. REV. 355 (1938); Puttkamer, Legislation Affecting the Deportation of Aliens, 3
U. OF CH. L. REV. 229 (1936). See also, Adamic, Aliens and Alien Baiters, 173 HARPERS 1
(Nov. 1936).
9. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (1946). Suspension has been granted to 32,358
aliens during the operation of the law. This is an average of 3,236 suspensions a year. Com-
munication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Raymond Farrell, Assistant Commissioner of
Immigration & Naturalization, dated Nov. 27, 1950, in Yale Law Library. The statute origi-
nally provided that all suspensions for more than six months were to be referred to Con-
gress. The deportation order was cancelled if Congress took no action. See MEMO. OF COM-
MISSIONER, supra note 8. In the first seven years of the law's operation, 19,000 cases were
submitted to Congress. None of these was rejected. In fact, Congress gave the cases little
attention. The Immigration Service, therefore, favored legislation providing for the elimina-
tion of the provision requiring submission to Congress. See H.R. 2933, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947). But control by Congress was strengthened, not relaxed. Under the present law, a
suspension of more than six months will not be allowed unless approved by affirmative
Congressional action. 62 STAT. 1206 (1948), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (Supp. 1950). See SEN. REP.
No. 1204, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). For a recent proposal favoring a return to the original
statutory scheme, see BERNARD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 296.
10. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155d (1946). See 8 CODE FED. REGS. § 150.10b
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must prove good moral character for the five years preceding his application
for suspension." He must not be ineligible for naturalization.
1 2 It must
also be established that deportation would result in a serious economic
detriment to his family.13
Congressional discussion of the law granting the Attorney-General the
power to suspend deportation orders indicates that most applications for
discretionary relief were expected to be granted. 14 Vesting this authority in
the Attorney-General was intended to alleviate the harshness of the earlier
statutory provisions. Harshness persists, however, where the Attorney-
General fails to give adequate consideration to the alien's case for suspension.
The courts have so far been unresponsive to the plight of aliens who allege
unfair treatment by the Attorney-General. Some flatly hold that the statute
confers absolute and unreviewable discretion. 15 Others, in what appears
(1949). The efforts of the Immigration Service to expand discretionary power to these
cases, provided the alien has lived in the U.S. for at least ten years, have not been successful.
See H.R. 2933, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and Testimony of Edward Shaughnessy, Hear-
iugs, supra note 5. See also BERNARD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 295.
11. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (1946).
12. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (1946). This provision was amended in 1948
to allow relief for persons ineligible for naturalization "by reason of race." 62 STAT. 1206
(1948), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (Supp. 1950). The amendment was primarily designed to aid eligible
Japanese aliens. See Hearings, supra note 5.
13. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (1946). A recent amendment permits the
Attorney-General to suspend deportation in cases of aliens who have resided in the U.S. for
seven years. A showing of economic detriment to the alien's family is not necessary in these
cases. 62 STAT. 1206 (1948), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (Supp. 1950).
14. Although the Attorney-General's suspension power is discretionary, Congress did
not rely on a narrow exercise of discretion to limit the number of suspensions. Instead,
Congress so drafted the statute as to prevent any undesirables from remaining in the country
as a result of the operation of the statute. Thus, Congress refused to adopt the proposal of
the Immigration Service which would have permitted the Attorney-General to suspend the
orders of all deportables. Congress instead diligently formulated eligibility requirements
which would bar undesirable aliens. "[t]he benefits . . . shall not be extended to aliens
who are deportable on grounds which may be generally described as those grounds which
indicate that such aliens are likely to be undesirable residents." CONF. REP. ON H.R. 5138,
76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940). The deliberate confinement of the power to cases which involve
desirable aliens strongly suggests that in those cases, the Congress assumed that the At-
torney-General would ordinarily suspend deportation. The debate in Congress was not
thorough. See, 86 CONG. REc. 9029-36 (1940).
15. See, e.g. Sleddens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 363 (2nd Cir. 1949); U.S. ex rel. Za-
badlija v. Garfinkel, 77 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1948). The most extreme statement of this
view is that of Judge Jerome Frank to the effect that the statute "confers discretionary un-
reviewable power." U.S. ex rel. Walther v. Dist. Director, 175 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1949). But,
Judge Frank has apparently retreated, for he now holds that the court "can compel correc-
tion of an abuse of discretion." Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950).
The Attorney-General has the power to allow technical deportables with good moral
character to depart voluntarily in lieuof deportation. 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155c
(1946). For instances of this discretion being regarded as absolute and unreviewable, see,
e.g. U.S. ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949); U.S. ex rel. Salvetti v.
Reimer, 103 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1939); U.S. ex rel. Von Kleczkowski v. Watkins, 71 F. Supp.
429 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
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to be the prevailing attitude, grant a very limited review of the discretion. 6
Under this position, the court will uphold the stated ground for denial of
relief by the Attorney-General if it could conceivably be relevant. However,
unfair treatment can be easily disguised by an ostensibly reasonable ground
of denial. Therefore, the more liberal view of the courts may give an alien
little more protection than he would enjoy in the total absence of review.
U.S. ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy '7 illustrates the meagre protection
afforded aliens by the courts. Kaloudis, an alien seaman, was found de-
portable for overstaying his permit to remain in the United States. Although
Kaloudis was found to qualify for the suspension of deportation relief,"5 his
application was denied because he had once belonged to an organization
listed by the Attorney-General as subversive." This decision was made
despite the evidence that his membership was innocent and non-political.
20
The ruling also ignored the fact that the membership was terminated before
the Attorney-General's list was compiled 21 and at a time when the organiza-
16. See, e.g. U.S. ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369, 373 (2d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948); Kavadias v. Cross, 82 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ind. 1948), reversed
on other grounds, 177 F.2d. 497 (7th Cir. 1949); Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999
(2d Cir. 1950).
For instances of a similar limited review asserted over the Attorney-General's discretion
to grant voluntary departure, see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Giacalone v. Miller, 86 F. Supp. 655
(S.D. N.Y. 1949); U.S. ex rel. Engelbert v. Watkins, 84 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. N.Y. 1946). Cf.
U.S. ex rel. U.S. Lines v. Watkins, 170 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1948).
17. 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950).
18. In establishing his qualifications for the relief, the alien is entitled to the same due
process protections that he receives in the determination of his deportability. See 8 CODE
FED. REGS. §§ 150.6(g)(c)(h), 150. 7 (c) (1949).
19. Kaloudis had once been a member of the International Workers Order. This or-
ganization was declared subversive by the Attorney-General pursuant to Exec. Order No.
9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947) which authorized loyalty checks for all federal employees.
Under existing decisions on the subject, it was not given an opportunity to challenge that
classification. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
International Workers Order v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 19
U.S.L. WEEK 3096 (1950). See also, Note, Designation of Organization as Subversive by
Attorney-General:A Cause of Action, 48 COL. L. REv. 1050 (1948).
The list of subversive organizations was designed for the specific purpose of aiding in
the determination of loyalty of federal employees. No mention is made in the executive
order authorizing the use of the list for other purposes. In the administration of the loyalty
program, membership in one of the listed organizations does not in itself establish dis-
loyalty. See letter of Seth Richardson, Chairman of Loyalty Review Board, Transcript of
Record, p. 17-18, Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950). Thus, in using
Kaloudis' membership in the I.W.O. as sole evidence of disqualification, the Attorney-
General was acting in a manner contrary to the established Loyalty Board procedure in cases
involving the loyalty of government employees.
20. Kaloudis apparently joined the I.W.O. in 1945 in order to take advantage of its
generous insurance and hospitalization benefits. Brie~for Relator, p. 4, Kaloudis v. Shaugh-
nessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950). He was a member for a year and a half until he joined the
Blue Cross hospitalization plan. He attended three meetings of the I.W.O. during his




tion was not regarded as a suspicious group by the Immigration Service.2 2
In court, Kaloudis alleged that the Attorney-General abused his discretion
in denying the application. This was rejected by the District Court which
disclaimed any review power over the discretion. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit took the view that a limited review is available where the
ground of denial is, on its face, unreasonable. 23 However, it upheld the
discretion in this case because it felt that membership in the proscribed or-
ganization might conceivably indicate disloyalty in some cases. In so doing,
it ignored any extenuating circumstances which might have established the
loyalty of the relator.
2 4
The refusal of the court to hold the Attorney-General accountable for the
exercise of his discretion, practically restores the automatic expulsion of the
old law. It may result in unwarranted hardship on the alien and his family.
Discretion which is practically unreviewed deprives the alien of the benefits
Congress intended to grant and leaves him without relief from unfair treat-
ment.
25
22. See, Matter of L-, 56107/933, 1 Ium. & NAT. SERV. DEc. 450 (1943) (member-
ship in the I.W.O. does not prejudice alien's receiving discretionary preexamination bene-
fit). Until the Kaloudis case, the Immigration Service had not formally modified its attitude
toward the I.W.O. See also, Stasiukevich v. Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1948) (member-
ship in I.W.O. cannot be the sole basis of denial of naturalization).
23. Judge Learned Hand held that the suspension "is a matter of grace, over which
courts have no review . . .unless it affirmatively appears that the denial has been ac-
tivated by considerations that Congress could not have intended to make relevant." U.S.
ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950). Judge Hand suggested as
examples of unreasonable considerations a denial on the ground that the alien attended
"too many baseball games or had bad table manners." Id. at 490. The circuit court's
approach to the problem is explained in the statement that the Attorney-General's authority
is exercised as a matter of grace, analogous to the pardoning power of the President. Id. at
491. But this analogy overlooks the consistent refusal of Congress to make the Attorney-
General's authority a general "pardoning" power as requested by the Immigration Service.
See note 14 supra. This refusal suggests that the eligible alien has a much stronger claim
for relief than mere grace.
24. The Kaloudis case should be contrasted with the case of Matter of K-, A-
5361313, 2 I2m. & NAT. SERV. DEC. 838 (1947). There suspension was granted to an alien
whose loyalty was seriously questioned due to his activities in the German-American Bund.
It was felt that the harshness which would be imposed upon the alien's family outweighed
these considerations of loyalty.
25. Much of the movement to reform the administration of the immigration laws was
an effort to remove opportunities for the exercise of arbitrary power. See OPPENHEIMER,
REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES C. III
(1931); VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 247-51. An example of the results which follow
from judicial refusal to curb arbitrary discretion is seen in U.S. ex rel. Ickowicz v. Day, 18
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1927). Though agreeing that the alien's case was "most deserving and
pathetic," the court nevertheless felt constrained only to appeal to the Attorney-General's
sense of justice for correction of the abuse. The court insisted that it was powerless to do
more.
The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 imposes additional harshness on de-
portable aliens. If deportation of the alien proves impracticable, the Attorney-General is
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Harshness also results where, as in the Kaloudis case, political criteria
are used in the decision. This puts an unnecessary additional loyalty hurdle
before the alien when he applies for suspension. If there is substantial evi-
dence of disloyalty, the alien can be deported on those grounds alone.28
Thus, ample protection is already afforded against those aliens who present
a real threat to the security of the country."
Moreover, denying an alien's claim for suspension on loyalty grounds
tends to undermine the protection that due process grants aliens deportable
for subversive activity. Recent cases have firmly established the necessity
of an exceedingly high degree of proof in order to secure deportation on
grounds of subversion. " By shifting the deportation charge from subversive
activity to the more technical and less serious charge of overstaying a permit,
the Attorney-General can secure deportation without proving that an alien
is actually subversive. He need only establish the technical grounds for
now given the power to keep the alien in custody until deportation can be effected. Pub. L.
No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. tit. 1, § 23 (Sept. 22, 1950).
26. The law requires deportation of aliens who, by reason of personal belief or organi-
zational affiliation, advocate either opposition to all organized government or forcible over-
throw of the U.S. Government. See 40 STAT. 1012 (1918), 41 STAT. 1008 (1920), 54 STAT.
673 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1946). For instances of deportations of radicals under these
provisions, see Lopez v. Howe, 259 Fed. 401 (2d Cir. 1919); U.S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Com-
missioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927). See also, Note, 48 YALE L.J. 111 (1938). Section 137 has
now been replaced by the more stringent provisions of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950. Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. tit. I § 22 (Sept. 22, 1950). As a result, the
Attorney-General must now deport, in addition to aliens already deportable, the following:
(1) Members or affiliates of the Communist Party; of its subsidiaries; or of any organi-
zations which are its direct predecessors or successors.
(2) Members or affiliates of any totalitarian party.
(3) Advocates of the "economic, international and governmental doctrines of world
communism" or affiliates of organizations which advocate those doctrines.
(4) Members of any "communist-front" organizations required to register under the
Act unless the aliens can demonstrate their ignorance of the communist character
of the organization.
27. Further protection against disloyal aliens might conceivably be introduced when
the alien seeks to establish his eligibility for suspension of deportation. If there is serious
question concerning his loyalty, the alien might be held to be lacking in the "good moral
character" required by the statute. However, such a procedure, in invoking political criteria
for moral character, would be subject to the same objections which are advanced against
the use of political criteria in denying suspension.
28. The requirements of due process of law were originally held to be satisfied if the
deportation order was supported by "some evidence." Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S.
103 (1927). However, as a result of Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), due process now
requires that the order be supported by substantial evidence See, Davis, Nonreaqewable
Administrative Action, 96 U. oF PA. L. REV. 749, 791 (1948). The Administrative Pro-
cedures Act of 1946 r~quires that agency action be supported by "substantial evidence." 60
STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009e (1946). Presumably, these provisions now apply to the Immi-
gration Service. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). A similarly high de-
gree of proof is required to denaturalize a naturalized citizen. See, Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118 (1942). See, also, Note. Recent Trends in Denaturalization in the United
States and Abroad, 44 COL. L. REV. 736 (1944).
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deportation and then deny any requests for suspension. Unless this discre-
tion is subjected to effective review, a mildly suspicious alien may be de-
ported with almost no proof of disloyalty while subversive aliens are given
the maximum protection of the law.
The courts should assume enough review power over the exercise of dis-
cretion by the Attorney-General to guarantee that claims for suspension are
treated fairly and with proper consideration. 29 The manner in which the
courts review the discretionary authority to grant bail in deportation cases
suggests a possible approach." In bail cases, the courts have laid down
standards to serve as guides for the Attorney-General in the exercise of his
authority.3' The discretion will not be upheld if the alien shows that the
decision does not conform to these standards.3 2 This provides some assur-
ance to the alien that his request for bail will be carefully considered. Similar
guides could be formulated to direct the Attorney-General in granting sus-
pension of deportation orders. The major criterion should be that the
29. Habeas corpus is the traditional method of securing review of deportation orders.
Gordon. Writ of Habeas Corpus in Deportation Proceedings, 3 Ii-if. & NAT. SERV. MON. REV.
218 (1945). However, habeas has been vigorously criticized as an ineffectual and cumber-
some method of review. See Orlow, Habeas Corpus in Immigration Cases, 10 OHIo ST. L.J.
319 (1949). If the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act apply to
deportation proceedings, more expeditious means of review will be available. See Kristen-
son v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 4057 (U.S. Dec. 11
1950) (review obtained through declaratory judgement). See, also, Note, The Impact of the
Federal Admin. Procedures Act on Deportation Proceedings, 49 COL. L. REv. 73 (1949). The
major barrier to applying the Act to suspension proceedings is the provision which denies
application "where agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." 60 STAT. 243,
5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946). However, this apparently will not prevent the courts from assert-
ing review over discretionary authority when they so desire. The Act provides that agency
action found to be "an abuse of discretion" be set aside. For a full discussion of the manner
in which courts are left to decide the scope of review over discretion, see Davis, supra note 28,
at 791.
30. The Attorney-General has the power to release an alien on bail pending the final
disposal of the case. 39 STAT. 890 (1917), 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1946). 8 CODE FED. REGs. § 150.5
(1949). The statutory language authorizing this power is as broad as the language con-
ferring discretionary power to suspend deportation orders. Yet the courts have asserted
considerable review power over the Attorney-General's exercise of the power. E.g. U.S.
ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Dir., 169 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1948); U.S. ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy,
177 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. U.S. ex rel. Bauer v. McGrath, 87 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. N.Y.
1949). See, also, Note, Detention and Bail in Deportation Proceedings, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 326
(1950). The courts do not hold that the Attorney-General must grant the alien's request for
bail. U.S. ex rel. Zapp v. Dist. Dir., 120 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1941). But they do hold that the
alien is entitled to a fair consideration and disposal of his request for bail. The extent to
which the courts will go in order to insure fair treatment and consideration for the alien is
suggested by the Pirinsky case, supra, where a bond of $25,000 was declared excessive.
31. In U.S. ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Dir., supra note 31, at 751, Judge A. Hand listed the
following factors upon which the discretion should depend: (1) the probability of the alien
being found deportable, (2) the seriousness of the charge against the alien, (3) the danger to
the public safety of the alien's presence within the community, and (4) the alien's availabil-
ity for subs6quent proceedings if given bail release.
32. Ibid. See also, U.S. exrel. Doylev. Dist. Dir., 169 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1948).
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